The Prima Facie Effect of Federal Trade Commission Orders in Clayton Act Treble Damage Actions by unknown
THE PRIMA FACIE EFFECT OF FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ORDERS IN CLAYTON
ACT TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS
The philosophy of the antitrust laws indicates a conscious
legislative determination that effective enforcement of these laws can
best be accomplished by a shared responsibility between
governmental organizations and private litigants. To further the
objectives of this joint operation, private litigants have been given
several significant benefits from the activities of federal antitrust
enforcers, primarily the use of prior government determinations as
evidence and a suspension of the statute of limitations. Previously,
the extent of the advantages secured depended on whether the Justice
Department or the Federal Trade Commission instigated the
antitrust action because these benefits were not accorded FTC
orders. Since a large part of the total enforcement activity in this
area is accomplished by the FTC,' in fact, to the total exclusion of
the Justice Department for certain portions of the antitrust laws, 2
any differences in the utilization of the "fruits" of litigation can be
quite significant. However, the recent trend has been toward a parity
between these two organizations regarding the subsequent effects of
their efforts vis-A-vis private litigation. This note will discuss the
most recent step in this trend-the admissibility of an FTC order as
prima facie evidence in a private treble damage suit.
Both the Sherman Act3 and the Clayton Act 4 contain provisions
whereby a person injured by a violation of the antitrust laws- may
recover treble damages from the violator as compensation for the
1. See generally Matteoni, An Antitrust Argument: Whether a Federal Trade Commission
Order is Within the Ambit of the Clayton Act's Section 5, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158, 159-
60 (1965).
2. The FTC's primary areas of responsibility include the Robinson-Patman Act (sections
2(a)-(f) of the Clayton Act) and section 3 of the Clayton Act. Barber, Private Enforcement
of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181, 191
(1961); 9 UTAH L. REv. 482, 487 (1964).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat.
209).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat.
730).
5. "Antitrust laws" are defined at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964) and include the Sherman, Wilson
Tariff, and Clayton Acts but not the Federal Trade Commission Act. See Nashville Milk Co.
v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958). See the text accompanying note 22 infra.
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injury caused by the infringement of these laws.' In 1914, section 5
of the Clayton Act7 was enacted to increase the effectiveness of the
treble damage provision in two ways. First, "a final judgment or
decree" from "any suit or proceeding in equity" brought by or for
the United States for a violation of the antitrust laws was to be
prima facie evidence against the defendant in a subsequent, private
treble damage suit.8 This provision represented a departure from the
common law rules of evidence' since, absent this mandate, a
conviction in a prior proceeding would not be admissible
substantively in a subsequent case.' 0 Second, the statute of
limitations was to be tolled or suspended during the pendency of the
government litigation."1 Although opinions differed as to whether the
6. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat.
731) provides for recovery of "threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." The Sherman Act also had a similar provision.
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210. See generally E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL
TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS (1965).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat.
731). See generally 2 H. TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAWS §§ 17.1-.8 (1949).
8. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat. 731. The text of the current version is as
follows:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to
the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such
defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a of this title, as to
all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between
the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments
or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees
entered in actions under section 15a of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964) (emphasis added) [hereinafter referred to as section 5(a)]. See
generally Shores, Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Admissibility of Prior Judgments Under
Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 54 IOWA L. REV. 434,451-54 (1968).
9. Buckeye Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918) (order from a prior
determination not admissible).
10. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 295, at 618 (1954). The Model Code of
Evidence, contrary to the common law rule, states that: "Evidence of a subsisting judgment
adjudging a person guilty of a crime or a misdemeanor is admissible as tending to prove facts
recited therein and every fact essential to sustain the judgment," MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 521 (1942). However, the rule is not supported by judicial decisions. Id., comment. Even
without statutory coverage, the trend is toward admissibility, at least where the procedures in
the first proceeding are adequate to insure trustworthiness. C. MCCORMICK, supra at 619 n.9.
11. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat. 731. The text of the current version is as
follows:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to
prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not including
an action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of limitations in
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primary objective of this provision was to benefit private parties
injured by antitrust transgressions 12 or to encourage the prompt
capitulation of persons being prosecuted by the government,' 3 the
szatute in operation has both effects.
A cursory reading of section 5 might suggest that a finding of
violation of the antitrust laws by almost any federal governmental
body would be admissible. However, the functions of an
administrative agency are not equivalent to those of a court. At the
time of the passage of section 5, orders of the FTC were effectively
advisory opinions that required judicial action for enforcement. 4
Explicit congressional attention to the relationship of the FTC and
section 5 is lacking, but the frequent reference to "courts"' 5 and
"day in court"'' 6 during debates prior to passage of section 5
sipports the inference that Congress did not equate activities of the
FTC with judicial proceedings.' 7
respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or
in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the
pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, however, That whenever the
ranning of the statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under section
15 of this title is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall
be forever barred unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within
four years after the cause of action accrued.
15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964) (emphasis added) [hereinafter referred to as section 5(b)].
12. Dix, Decrees and Judgments Under Section 5 of the Clayton Antitrust Law, 30 GEO.
L.J. 331, 333-34 (1942); Note, Government Antitrust Judgments as Evidence in Private
Actions, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1400 (1952).
13. Dix, supra note 12, at 334-35; McConnell, The Treble Damage Action, 1950 U. ILL.
L. FORUM 659, 672; Comment, Admissibility and Evidentiary Effect of Criminal Judgments
Under Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, I JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PRO. 111, 112
(1967).
14. Wilson, Federal Trade Commission Orders and the Clayton Act § 5: A
Reexamination, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 27, 31 (1967). See also FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
274 U.S. 619, 623 (1927) (FTC has only administrative functions, not judicial); G.
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 45 (1925); Austern, Five Thousand Dollars a
Day-An Inquiry Into the Civil Penalty Consequences of Violation of a Federal Trade
Commission Cease and Desist Order, 21 A BA ANTITRUST SECTION 285, 288 (1962).
15. Various references to "court" are contained in congressional debates: "obtained a
judgment, either in a court of law or equity." 51 Co.'G. REC. 16319 (1914). "IT]he Trade
Commission could not deal with criminal penalties because it is not a court." Id. at 16154.
"The judgment or decree of the court in the suit." Id. at 13850 (emphasis added in all
quotations).
16. E.g., id. at 13851. "The defendant . ..has had its day in court. It has had an
opportunity to try out before a court, with all the forms of the law, every question involved
in the lawsuit." Id. (emphasis added).
17. Butler, Application and Constitutionality of Tolling of Statute of Limitations
Provisions of Section 5, Clayton Act, In Cases of Dual Ehforcement Jurisdiction, 8 ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION 42, 46 (1956). But see 51 CONG. REC. 13857 (1914). "[lI]n an action
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Nine years after the passage of the Clayton Act, a federal
district court in Proper v. John Bene & Sons, Inc.18 articulated the
dichotomy that has survived substantially unchallenged until 1969:
A Federal Trade Commission proceeding is not equivalent to a
judicial determination for purposes of section 5(a). Proper brought
a private treble damage suit against John Bene as well as other
defendants in which he attempted to utilize an FTC cease and desist
order 9 issued for John Bene's violation of section 5 of the FTC
Act.2" In dictum, 21 the court established six reasons why an FTC
order cannot be used as prima facie evidence under section 5(a) of
the Clayton Act:
(1) An FTC order is not a final judgment or decree.
(2) Proceedings before the FTC are not proceedings in equity
since an order has no effect until sanctioned by a court of appeals.
(3) The proceeding is on behalf of the FTC rather than the
United States.
(4) A proceeding instituted under the FTC Act is not one under
the antitrust laws as it is omitted from the statutory definition of
"antitrust laws."12 2
(5) An FTC Act violation is not a violation of the antitrust
laws.
(6) All of the defendants in the civil suit were not defendants
in the FTC proceeding.23
brought against an individual who has never theretofore had his day in court you can not make
• . . an order of an administrative board conclusive evidence against him. You may make it
prima facie evidence." Id. at 13856-57.
18. 295 F. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923), rev'd, 299 F. 468 (1924).
19. John Bene & Sons, 5 F.T.C. 314 (1922). John Bene had circulated false and misleading
reports of a chemical analysis of hydrogen peroxide distributed by a competitor, Proper
Antiseptic Laboratories of Cincinnati.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
21. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 216 F. Supp. 507,
510 (D.N.J. 1963).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964). See also Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 5 TRADE
REG. REP. 73,093 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 1970) (agency finding of a violation of section 5 of
the FTC Act not determinative in a subsequent treble damage action for a violation of sections
I and 2 of the Clayton Act). But see Lippa's, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 182 (D.
Vt. 1969) (action under FTC Act tolls statute of limitations under section 5(b)).
23. [T]he court is constrained to hold: (1) That the proceedings before the Federal
Trade Commission did not result in a final judgment or decree. (2) There is grave doubt
whether the proceedings before the Commission is a proceeding in equity. The
Commission itself is rather an investigating body than a judicial tribunal, and its order
has no binding effect until it has received the judicial sanction of the Circuit Court of
[Vol. 1970:351
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The Proper criteria were not questioned24 until Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Co. v. American Bowling & Billard Corp.25 in 1945.
Initially, the Second Circuit allowed the admission of an FTC cease
and desist order issued for a Clayton Act section 3 violation under
the rationale that a 1938 amendment 26 had made an FTC order final
unless review was sought within a specified period." On rehearing,
however, the court realized that the amendment was only concerned
with orders issued after the determination of an FTC Act, rather
than Clayton Act, violation and therefore held that the proffered
evidence should be excluded. 28 Arguably, the court had thereby
dismissed the other Proper objections and had accepted an order
emanating from an FTC proceeding as equivalent to a judicial
determination for section 5(a) purposes, with the exception of the
finality problem.29
Appeals. (3) Strictly speaking, it would seem that the proceeding is not brought by or
on behalf of the United States, inasmuch as it is instituted by the Federal Trade
Commission, although it may well be held that this body as a creature of the
government may be said to be acting on behalf thereof. (5) The suit or proceeding must
be brought under the anti-trust laws. Neither the Federal Trade Commission Act in
its references to anti-trust acts, nor the Clayton Act in its references to anti-trust laws,
includes the Federal Trade Commission Act in such a classification. Therefore the
proceeding before the Federal Trade Commission is not such a proceeding as is held
by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to be competent evidence, as
asserted by plaintiff. (5) The discussion of the fourth requirement is applicable to the
fifth. (6) The act permits the proceedings before the Commission to be received as
prima facie evidence against such defendant. In the case at bar there are various other
defendants. 295 F. at 732.
Proper was a particularly appropriate case to raise the finality issue since the FTC order was
later reversed. See note 18 supra.
24. Proper was noted as precedent in International Tag & Salesbook Co. v. American
Salesbook Co., 6 F.R.D. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). See also Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244
F.2d 53, 59 n.4 (2d Cir. 1957).
25. 150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), modified on rehearing, 150 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 757 (1945).
26. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 5(g), 52 Stat. 113 provided:
(g) An order of the Commission to cease and desist shall become final-
(1) Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review. . .or
(2) Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari ...
or
(3) - Upon the denial of a petition for certiorari. . . or
(4) Upon the expiration of thirty days from the date of issuance of the mandate of
the Supreme Court. . ..
This amendment is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 21(g) (1964).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1964).
28. 150 F.2d at 74.
29. See 9 UTAH L. REv. 482, 484 (1964). In Brunswick, the proceeding was instituted for
Vol. 1970: 35 11
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Two statutory changes of significance have been enacted since
1945. In 1955, the words "any suit or proceeding in equity or
criminal prosecution" of both sections 5(a) and 5(b) were replaced
with the phrase "any civil or criminal proceeding."'30 Congressional
intentions regarding this change are not clear,3 but a logical
explanation is that the modification was enacted to make the
Clayton Act nomenclature equivalent to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.32 A more significant amendment was the Finality Act of
1959,33 wherein section II of the Clayton Act was modified to
provide finality to orders for "antitrust law" violations issued by the
FTC if not appealed within 60 days. 3 ' This would appear to remove
the belated objection in Brunswick that an FTC order entered for a
Clayton Act violation was not final.3 1
Subsequent to these statutory changes, most of the developments
have involved the tolling provision of section 5(b) which, although
worded in nearly identical terms to the evidentiary provision of
section 5(a), 36 certainly demands a lower level of procedural fairness
than the latter.3 7 For various reasons, courts were still hesitant to
consider an FTC proceeding as a "civil or criminal proceeding" for
purposes of suspending the statute of limitations. Tolling by an FTC
order was not allowed in Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd D. Fry
a violation of the Clayton Act, an antitrust law, and the sole defendant in the FTC proceeding
was the sole defendant in the private treble damage action thereby removing Proper's fourth,
fifth, and sixth objections. In order to have reached its initial result, the Brunswick court must
have dismissed the second and third objections and determined that FTC proceedings were
proceedings in equity on behalf of the United States.
30. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 2, 69 Stat. 283, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(a) & (b)
(1964). For the full text of section 5, see note 8 supra.
31. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 334-
35 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (no change intended by 1955 Act); Matteoni, supra note I,
at 164-65; 65 COLUM. L. REv. 158, 161 (1965).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 states "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action.'"
33. Act of July 23, 1959, Pub. L. 86-107, § 1, 73 Stat. 243.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 21(g) (1964). The text of this section appears at note 26 supra.
35. See Kauper, Cease and Desist: The History, Effect, and Scope of Clayton Act Orders
of the Federal Trade Commission, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1095, 1110-14 (1968).
36. Both provisions use the phrase "any civil or criminal proceeding" and apparently
require the action to be brought by the United States. Of course there are significant
differences due to the varied functions of the two sections. The most significant of these is
that section 5(a) requires afinal judgment or decree while section 5(b) becomes operative once
a proceeding is instituted, regardless of the outcome.
37. See text accompanying notes 118-21 infra.
38. 223 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
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Roofing Co.3 under the rationale that the 1955 amendment did not
specifically refer to FTC proceedings,'39 and also on the basis that a
plaintiff should not have the benefit of the statute of limitations
suspension if the FTC order is appealed since the defendant may
prevail on appeal." The district court in Highland Supply Corp. v.
Reynolds Metals Co.4" reached the same conclusion, primarily
because the "plain meaning" of a civil or criminal proceeding is a
judicial proceeding. 2 An analysis of legislative history provided
support for the refusal to apply section 5(b) to toll the statute of
limitations by FTC orders in the first Farmington Dowel Products
Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co. 3 case. The court concluded that the original
congressional understanding in 1914 that an agency proceeding was
not to be accorded the same effect as a judicial determination had
not been altered by subsequent amendments.4
The first decision to hold that the initiation of an FTC action
tolled the statute of limitations under section 5(b) was New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.45
The district court determined that a consent decree obtained by the
FTC would suspend the statute of limitations by concluding that
even though section 5(a) specifically precluded the utilization of a
consent decree as prima facie evidence of a violation, no such
proviso negated the application of section 5(b). Rather the legislative
purpose pursuant to which section 5 was adopted allowed the
application of section 5(b) to the FTC when an action was
commenced.46 The Third Circuit affirmed4 7 by interpreting the
phrase "proceeding in equity' of the original statute to refer to the
39. Id. at 713.
40. The court reasoned that if an action, otherwise barred by the statute of limitations, were
allowed before the FTC order was enforced by the court of appeals, a party might get the
benefit of section 5(b) without a determination that he was entitled to this benefit.
41. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964), on remand, 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.
Mo. 1965).
42. 221 F. Supp. at 17.
43. 223 F. Supp. 967 (D. Me. 1963).
44. Id. at 972-74. "The overwhelming impression one forms after reading the legislative
history of the original Clayton Act is that none of the members of Congress in 1914
contemplated that Federal Trade Commission proceedings were within the purview of Section
5." Id. at 973.
45. 216 F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1963).
46. Id. at 510-11.
47. 332 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1964), noted in 65 COLUM. L. REV. 158 (1965), 53 GEO. L.J.
481 (1965), 78 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1964), and 9 UTAH L. REv. 482 (1964).
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court of appeals action that was formerly required to enjoin the
violation of an FTC order's-FTC orders not originally being self
enforcing .4  After the Finality Act of 1959, this step was not
necessary, and thus the FTC proceedings were taken to have the
same effect as the proceedings in equity formerly required." The
court of appeals equivocated regarding the independence of sections
5(a) and 5(b), and concluded that even if, contrary to the district
court's decision, 5' the provisions were dependent or complementary,
there was "no reason why final FTC orders enforcing the Clayton
Act should not be admitted as prima facie evidence under Section
5(a)."55
The Supreme Court was not required to decide the 5(a) issue but
did affirm the Third Circuit's application of section 5(b). 53 The
Court determined that sections 5(a) and 5(b) were not necessarily
coextensive" for several reasons. Section 5(a)'s requirement of "final
judgment or decree" which is "of crucial significance in its
application" 5 is not mentioned in section 5(b) since the latter's
applicability is not dependent on the outcome of the Government's
case. Second, section 5(a) is limited to matters defined by estoppel
principles while section 5(b) applies if the subsequent private action
is based on "any matter" in the prior suit.57 The congressional
objectives in the two provisions were seen to support an
independence since section 5(a) was concerned with the "delicate
area""e where a judgment in an action involving two parties could
48. Kauper, supra note 35, at 1142 n.200 (FTC order after review is still based on
administrative findings and it would not be desirable to penalize a party for seeking review);
Rockefeller, The Supreme Court and the Private Antitrust Plaintiff, 7 B.C. IND. & Cot. L,
REv. 279, 286-87 (1966).
49. An FTC order was to be more of a "notice" than an injunction and had no effect until
enforced by the court of appeals. 332 F.2d at 356.
50. Id.; Matteoni, supra note 1, at 163.
51. 216 F. Supp. 507,509-10 (D.N.J. 1963).
52. 332 F.2d at 357.
53. 381 U.S. 311 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as 3M]. See Note, Federal Trade
Proceedings and Section 5 of the Clayton Act: Application and Implication, 64 Micti. L. REv.
1156 (1966). See also Wilson, supra note 14, at 42.
54. 381 U.S. at 318.
55. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 316-17.
57. "Whatever ambiguities may exist in the legislative history. . . it is plain that in § 5(b)
Congress meant to assist private litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull from
government antitrust actions." Id. at 317.
58. Id.
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be used by a third party not a participant in the first action and is
restricted by due process requirements; 9 section 5(b) was to assist
plaintiffs to secure any benefits obtainable from governmental
action. The Court specifically refrained from ruling on the
application of section 5(a) to agency proceedings."0 As to section 5(b)
itself, the Court admitted that there was no legislative history to
support the inclusion of FTC actions within section 5(b) 1 but noted
that this was not determinative of an intention to exclude. 62
Concluding that Congress had not considered this matter, the Court
held that the clearly expressed congressional objective of assistance
to private litigants would be served only if section 5(b) tolled the
statute of limitations for agency proceedings.6 3 Justice Black's
dissent was based on a thorough analysis of the history of section 5
indicating that Congress had not intended that an FTC proceeding
be given the same effect as a court proceeding."
In Farmington Dowel Products Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co.,"s the
First Circuit became the first court of appeals to hold that a cease
and desist order by the FTC could be used as prima facie evidence
under section 5(a). Based on a complaint filed in 1958, the FTC
Trial Examiner in 1962 found Forster Manufacturing in violation of
section 2(a) of the Clayton Act due to its discriminatory pricing
practices for the woodenware it manufactured.66 The Commission
59. Id. at 318, citing Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 569 (10th
Cir. 1962).
60. "Even if we assumed arguendo that § 5(a) is inapplicable to Commission
proceedings-a question upon which we venture no opinion. ... 381 U.S. at 318.
61. "Admittedly, there is little in the legislative history to suggest that Congress consciously
intended to include Commission actions within the sweep of the tolling provision." Id. at 320.
62. The Court did not consider that whenever Congress intends to include agency affairs
in a statute, it does not use the phrase "civil proceeding," but "agency proceeding" or
"adjudication." See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) & (12) (Supp. IV. 1969).
63. 381 U.S. at 320-21. See also Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
64. 381 U.S. at 324 (Black, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra. This
was also the position taken by the amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General. Brief for
Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae at 35, Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965). The majority position was that the legislative history was
inconclusive. 381 U.S. at 320.
65. 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1969); accord, Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 308 F.
Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Y & Y Popcorn Supply Co. v. ABC Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp.
709 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Carpenter v. Central Ark. Milk Producers Ass'n, 1966 Trade
Cas. 71,817 (W.D. Ark). Contra, Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F.
Supp. 510 (E.D Mo. 1965).
66. Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852, 888 (1963). The trial examiner found that Forster,
with precatory intent, engaged in illegal price discrimination in wooden meat skewers,
clothespins, and ice cream spoons. Id. at 884-85.
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adopted the Trial Examiner's cease and desist order with minor
modification in 1963.67 Two of the five FTC members did not
participate and one commissioner dissented.68 The First Circuit set
aside the Commission's order on the basis that an erroneous
standard of proof had been applied when the party attempted to
assert the defense of "meeting competition in good faith."6 During
the pendency of the case at the court of appeals, Farmington
Manufacturing Company attempted to initiate a private treble
damage suit by utilizing the previous FTC order to toll the statute
of limitations under section 5(b) but was unsuccessfu170 -3M having
not yet been decided. On remand, the FTC reconsidered the
"meeting competition" defense but affirmed its earlier decision,7
modifying the original cease and desist order slightly to meet some
of the objections of the court of appeals." On the second appeal, the
First Circuit accepted the Commission's new findings;73 Forster's
argument that the original order was invalid due to concurrences by
only two commissioners-only three of the five participated-was
not accepted since the complaint was not raised on the first appeal.7
A timely objection could have been cured at the second FTC hearing
-which was before the entire five-man Commission.
Since the statute of limitations problem had been resolved by the
Supreme Court in 3M, Farmington, a competing manufacturer of
woodenware who was allegedly driven out of business as a result of
Forster's antitrust violations,75 again sought treble damages, now
attempting to utilize the FTC's cease and desist order under section
5(a). Introduction into evidence of portions of that order was
allowed by the district court where Farmington was awarded
67. Id. at 928.
68. Id. at 923. The dissenter felt that the FTC's action in "throwing the book" at a person
engaged in reprehensible conduct was not supported by the record. Id. at 924.
69. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
See generally H. BLAKE & R. PITOFSKY, CASES & MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST LAW 1160-62
(1967).
70. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967 (D. Me. 1963),
noted in 17 VAND. L. REv. 1310 (1964).
71. For$ter Mfg. Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,304 (FTC
1965).
72. 335 F.2d at 56-57.
73. 361 F.2d 340 (lst Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
74. Id. at 342-43. Subsequent to this case, the Supreme Court approved a cease and desist
order issued by only two of the three participating Commissioners. FTC v. Flotfill Prods.,
Inc., 389 U.S. 179 (1967).
75. Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852 (1963).
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$329,000 in damages, 76 and the decision was affirmed by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals. 77 Judge Coffin, in a logical opinion that
evidenced a thorough understanding of the ppijcable prope.ets,
used the six criteria established by Proper v. John Bene & Sons78 as
the starting point. Since the FTC's action against Forster for a
Clayton Act violation was by statute an action undor g "gtjtiust
law,""8 and the defendant in the instant case was the pqarty ag;inst
whom the FTC had acted, only three of Proper's six objections
applied: that an FTC proceeding lacked finality, was not a
"proceeding in equity," and was not brought by the United States.s
3M was utilized to answer two of the three protestations.
Acknowledging the "greater delicacy" of section 5(a),81. the First
Circuit found that, in the absence of contrary legislative history, 3M
applied to both parts of section 5 in its holding that an FTC
proceeding is a "civil or criminal proceeding" brought by the
United States82 since words identical to those necessarily construed
by the Supreme Court to reach the result in 3M for section 5(b) are
also used in section 5(a).83 Thus, the sole obstacle to the application
of section 5(a) to FTC orders was the question whether a
Commission order is a "final judgment or decree" as that phrase is
used in section 5(a).
The Finality Act of 1959 supplied the statutory provision to
make an FTC order for a Clayton Act violation final 4 and left as
the single remaining issue whether an FTC order should be
denominated a "judgment or decree." Admitting that as a matter
76. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 924 (D. Me. 1969)
(analysis of fees); 299 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Me. 1967) (extent of admissibility of FTC order);
299 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Me. 1967) (section 5(a) issue).
77. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (lst Cir. 1969).
78. 295 F. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923). See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
79. The FTC's action against Forster was for violation of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,
which, unlike the FTC Act, is an antitrust law. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
80. 421 F.2d at 67 n.7.
81. Id. at 68.
82. "[W]e do believe that 3M necessarily held that a Commission proceeding is a 'civil or
criminal proceeding brought by the United States' for purposes of section 5." Id. at 69.
83. The court noted that it was "inconceivable" that the same words used in section 5(a)
would have a different meaning than was attributed to them in section 5(b) by the Court in
3M. Id.
84. The court saw the Finality Act as having significance for two reasons: (1) The authority
of John Bene and its progeny was negated; (2) The FTC order admitted by,the district court
was made final by the Act. Id. at 70.
85. Farmington's argument that the Finality Act was not applicable to the FTC order since
the proceeding was commenced before the Act's passage was rejected. Id. n.25. The
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of semantics these words have historically referred only to judicial
pronouncements, the court utilized legislative history86 to support its
contention that the drafters of section 5(a) in 1914 did not intend
that the rights created by this enactment should be dependent on the
forum utilized to prosecute antitrust violators, but rather intended
that section 5(a) would be applicable if the procedural safeguards of
the proceeding are sufficient to assure the fairness connotated by the
phrase "day in court" as used by section 5's authors.
After a brief review of the total FTC procedural framework," the
court focused on the primary objections raised by Forster-that
hearsay evidence admissible in an FTC proceeding would not be
admitted under judicial rules of evidence and that no separation
existed between the prosecutorial and judicial functions within the
FTC. While hearsay evidence that would not be admissible under the
common law evidence rules is admissible in administrative
adjudications, 89 the court concluded that this admission was unlikely
to be dispositive, especially in a non-jury trial." Regarding the
separation of functions, the lack of complete separation was
acknowledged, 9 but the internal separation of functions
characteristic of the FTC92 was determined to satisfy due process
district court in Purex disagreed with the First Circuit's reasoning on this issue, but found
that the purpose for requiring a final judgment, that a decision which might be reversed should
not be usable in a private suit, was fulfilled by the Supreme Court's affirmation of the
antitrust violation in that case. Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 587-
88 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
86. 421 F.2d at 71 n.27.
87. Congressmen . . . were not thinking in terms of the particular institutions which
would satisfy their "day in court" assurance for defendants . . . Congress was using
[this] terminology more in the generic sense of a full opportunity to be heard and have
one's case determined with finality in a proceeding in which fairness is assured. Id. at
72-73.
88. Id. at 73-74. This discussion by the court was adequate, but not in the depth of other
portions of the opinion.
89. L. JAFFEE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIyE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 432 (1968).
90. "[Any difference. . . between the courts and the Commission regarding hearsay is one
of degree and unlikely to be dispositive." 421 F.2d at 74. However, a quote utilized by the
court from United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D. Mass. 1950),
indicated that hearsay was admissible in antitrust cases because a defendant could suffer "at
most an injunction and order without monetary damages." But if section 5(a) is applicable,
large amounts of monetary damages will ultimately be at stake. E.g., Purex Corp. v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 585 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (action for over five hundred million
dollars).
91. The FTC was contrasted with the NLRB which has a complete separation of functions.
421 F.2d at 74.
92. 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(0 (1969) requires that hearing examiners not be directly responsible
to persons engaged in prosecutorial functions.
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requirements. This position was reached by using the ICC as an
analogy since the orders of that agency, which has an internal
separation of functions similar to the FTC, are admissible as prima
facie evidence in subsequent trials.9 3 On broader due process
grounds, the FTC proceeding was found to be sufficiently fair to
allow the admission of the ensuing order since only a rebuttable
presumption was created, thereby taking nothing from the province
of the jury. 4 The procedure was evidently determined to be
sufficiently fair by Congress since a statute provides that a final
order can be the unimpeachable basis for suits for violations of FTC
commands.95 The court also noted that to hold that an FTC order
is not usable under section 5(a) would be extremely unfair to the
plaintiff by making the usability of the Government's labor turn on
an arbitrary allocation of enforcement effort between the FTC and
Justice Department.96
Another significant issue was considered in Farmington. On
cross-appeal, Farmington had contended that the district court erred
in permitting only the final order of the FTC to be admitted rather
than the Examiner's initial decision and the opinion of the
Commission. For support on this issue, Farmington cited Hanover
Sloe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.98 as broadening the
scope of admissibility under section 5(a) over the rule established in
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.99 The Emich Motors
standard of the applicable collateral estoppel principle is to admit
"all matters of fact and law necessarily decided"'10 in the previous
93. This analogy is not.perfect since the prima facie effect of the ICC orders is specifically
provided for by statute. 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964) ("[T]he complainant . . . may file . . . a
complaint. . . and the order of the Commission [is admissible] .... ") (emphasis added).
94. 421 F.2d at 75, citing Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412,430 (1915).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 21(1) (1964) provides: "Any person who violates any order issued by the
Commission . . .shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than
$5,000 for each violation." Similarly, see 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1964).
96. 421 F.2d at 76. See generally Butler, supra note 17, at 48-52. This "bootstrap"
argument was also used by the Supreme Court in 3M. 381 U.S. at 320. While it is appealing
on equitable grounds, it is not responsive to the central issue involved. Any arbitrariness which
results from the allocation of antitrust cases between the Justice Department and the FTC
has no relation to the fairness of using the results of either branch's efforts.
97. Farmington had requested admission for the examiner's initial decision, the original
opinion and order of the Commission, and the opinion and order after remand. 421 F.2d at
77 n.40.
98. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
99. 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
t00. Id. at 569 (emphasis added). However, one commentator has suggested that section 5
is more a rule of evidence than of estoppel, since estoppel is to discourage litigation rather
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adjudication; Hanover Shoe was interpreted by Farmington to allow
the admission of findings that are merely relevant to a subsequent
proceeding.'10 The court rejected this analysis and restated the
"necessarily decided" standard in terms of fairness when the parties
concentrate on matters of central importance to the litigation."'-2
However, the lower court's refusal to admit the FTC finding
regarding Forster's "meeting competition" defense was found to be
erroneous, since this issue was 'necessarily decided," but this
mistake did not rise to the level of reversible error.' "'
Two lines of inquiry are necessary in an evaluation of the
Farmington position regarding section 5(a): What is the proper
theory of statutory construction to be applied, and, if the matter is
not foreclosed at this point, how do the FTC's proceedings compare
with those of courts? There is little doubt that the purpose of section
5 is to aid private litigants to collect damages from violators of the
antitrust laws. This conclusion is amply supported by the history of
the legislation i 4 and is sanctioned by both the majorityl"', and
than encourage it as section 5 does. Hardy, The Evisceration of Section 5 of the Clayton Act,
49"GEo. L.J. 44,47-48 (1960).
101. 421 F.2d at 78.
102. "But since parties can be expected to exert their full effort only on what seems essential
at the time, it seems unfair to close the door to issues which have not been on stage center
" Id. at 79.
103. The court did not see how additional findings of monopolization could increase the
damages awarded to Farmington. "'Were Caesar to be run through thrice, he would not be
thrice dead." Id. at 80.
Another interesting issue discussed concerned the allowance for reasonable attorney's fees
as provided by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). The district court had found that S85,000 was
a "reasonaole" attorney's fee, but, upon learning of the contingent fee arrangement whereby
counsel was to receive the "reasonable attorney's fee" plus one third of the trebled damages,
refrained from awarding that amount, reasoning that if the award were made. the total
amount received by the attorneys would be in excess of the "reasonable amount" and
therefore in contravention of the statute. The First Circuit agreed that the court had power
to reduce fees but interpreted the statute to require the awarding of the "reasonable amount"
to the plaintiff rather than the attorney and not to preclude counsel from receiving both the
$85.000 and the agreed upon portion of the treble damage award from the victor. The matter
was remanded for a separate determination of the maximum amount that could be accepted
by counsel consistent with the Canon of Ethics. Upon a subsequent motion by Farmington
to recover S17,000 as attorney's fees for the appeal itself, the court awarded $4,000. Although
they declined to fragment the appeal into parts won and lost by plaintiff, it did consider that
the significant portion of plaintiff's brief Ahich was directed toward securing a reversal and
new trial with potential for a larger judgment was not compensable. 421 F.2d at 91.
104. "T -e entire provision [section 5] is intended to help persons of small means who are
injured in their property or business by combinations or corporations violating the antitrust
laws." H. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914).
105. 38' U.S. at 318-19.
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minority opinions"o6 in 3M. But this does not settle the question of
how and to what extent Congress intended to help. A blind
application of one principle of construction-that ". . the purpose
of a statutory provision is the best test of the meaning of the words
chosen" 0 70-would necessarily allow prima facie effect to be given
FTC orders since the aid thus provided plaintiffs is obvious. But
maxims of statutory construction can be found to support almost
any desired result. 05 Applying the equally accepted theory that
"resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the
Act is inescapably ambiguous"'' 9 would command a contrary result
since the Supreme Court in 3M admitted that the "precise language
of § 5(b) does not clearly encompass Commission proceedings."' 10
And although the majority in 3M did not discern any Congressional
intent in 1914 regarding coverage of the FTC,"' Justice Black's
dissent is more persuasive in its conclusion that Congress did not
intend section 5 to apply to administrative proceedings."12 Given this
apparent conflict between the statutory purpose and the clear
meaning of the words utilized, 1 3  the most satisfactory
interpretational guideline would appear to be as expressed by Judge
Learned Hand:
We are to put ourselves so far as we can in the position of the legislature
that uttered [the words of the statute], and decide whether or not it would
106. "[Section] 5 . . was passed in response to President Wilson's 1914 plea to Congress
to enact a law designed to make it easier for antitrust victims to collect damages through
private lawsuits. ... Id. at 325 (Black, J., dissenting).
107. Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959).
108. 12 MODERN FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST §§ 174-223 (1960).
109. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
110. 381 U.S. at 321.
111. "Admittedly, there is little in the legislative history to suggest that Congress
consciously intended to include Commission actions within the sweep of the tolling provision.
But neither is there any substantial evidence that it consciously intended to exclude them."
Id. at 320.
112. Id. at 324-34 (Black, J., dissenting).
As my Brother Black has so well demonstrated in his dissenting opinion, both the
language and legislative history of the statutes before us clearly show that Congress
did not intend that the statute of limitations applicable to private antitrust actions be
tolled by the institution of a Federal Trade Commission administrative proceeding. Id.
at 335 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
See also 9 UTAH L. REV. 482, 486 (1964). 3M's lack of explanation regarding statutory
construction was criticized by Wilson, supra riote 14, at 38.
113. As the Farmington court admitted: "Were we to proceed semantically, we would have
to acknowledge that these words 'judgment or decree' historically have referred only, or
chiefly, to courts." 421 F.2d at 71.
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declare that the situation that has arisen is within what it wishes to cover.
Indeed, at times the purpose may be so manifest as to override even the
explicit words used.'
Thus, even though the procedures of the FTC in 1914 were not
adequate to comply with due process requirements, "5 application of
this standard requires an evaluation, as was recognized in
Farmington,"" of the current adjudicative procedures of the FTC as
compared to those of the judicial process."7
The procedural elements necessary to assure fairness before the
results of a proceeding should be utilized as prima facie evidence
under section 5(a) can be distinguished from those required before
the statute of limitations can be tolled under section 5(b). Since
section 5(b) is concerned only with the institution of an action"' and
does not depend on the outcome of the litigation,"9 proper notice
114. Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959). But see 421 F.2d at 73.
("[W]e do not understand our function to be simply to speculate what Congress would have
done if it squarely addressed this issue in 1914.") 'To the same effect for Constitutional
interpretations, Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blasdell, 290 U.S. 398,442-43 (1934).
115. Commentators in 1916 catalogued the short-comings of the FTC as follows:
[I]t seems entirely clear from the nature of the statutory proceeding that the
Commission ... cannot be properly regarded as a court, or as exercising any judicial
power whatsoever within the sense and meaning of the Constitution.
The fact that the Commission cannot issue any coercive process to compel the
appearance of the accused, or to enforce obedience to its orders, and the further fact
that in proceedings before the Commission there shall not be adversary parties litigant,
but the Commission itself shall be the actor in the first instance, completely
differentiate the Commission from a court.
The Commission is not in any aspect an impartial adjudging body, as is a court. It
is essentially an accusing body . . . .Congress intended that the Commission, before
instituting any proceeding, should investigate exparte, and should measurably prejudge,
the guilt of any suspect against whom the issuance of a complaint might be
contemplated. J. HARLAN & L. MCCANDLESS, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssIoN 54-
55 (1916).
116. "[W]e conclude that the critical question is whether the procedural safeguards of the
commission are substantial enough to assure the defendant the 'day in court'. . . ." 421 F.2d
at 73.
117. Although the following discussion concerns only the FTC, the procedural fairness
provided by the rules of other agencies may eventually require consideration, since other
agencies, the ICC, FCC, CAB and FRB, may enforce specified portions of the Clayton Act in
areas within their jurisdiction. Matteoni, supra note 1, at 169. Of course, some of the general
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act may be applicable to these
agencies also.
118. "Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States. . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964) (emphasis added).
119. The section 5(a) proviso regarding consent decrees and decrees entered before the taking
of testimony is omitted from section 5(b). Compare id. § 15(a) with id. § 15(b). See also
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 316 (1965).
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would appear to satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. 20
However, the totality of procedures including notice, hearing
procedures, decisional processes, and standards of review must be
fair before the results of a prior determination are deemed
trustworthy enough to be admissible into evidence. The Supreme
Court has recognized this distinction 2 1 and in 3M implicitly
determined that the notice provided by the FTC2 2 was sufficient, at
least for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.1 3
In evaluating the remaining elements of an administrative
proceeding, the standards provided by the Administrative Procedure
Act 24 as well as the FTC's Rules of Practice2 5 should be considered
since the A PA provides the statutory basis for the procedures of
agencies subject to that Act. 26 Although the rules of practice of the
FTC may at a given moment be more liberal or pro-respondent than
those of the APA, the agency rules are subject to change by the
agency without public participation.'2 Thus the APA provides a
minimum level of protection below which the FTC cannot legally
operate.
Several components should be considered in analyzing the
fairness of the hearing or adjudication itself, including discovery and
other preliminary activities, right to counsel, right to confront
winnesses, and evidentiary rules. Although the discovery provided by
the FTC rules2 8 is certainly not equivalent to that provided by the
120. From a theoretical standpoint, notice of a pending FTC action should be sufficient to
warn the litigant that he should preserve all records and materials that may be necessary to
defend against a subsequent treble damage suit.
121. 381 U.S. at 317-18.
122. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (Supp. IV, 1969); 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.11, 3.41(c) (1969).
Coincidentally, Forster's first appeal involved the FTC's amending of its complaint, but their
objection was rejected. 355 F.2d at 50.
123. However, notice of an FTC action is not necessarily equivalent to notice regarding a civil
action for treble damages. In the former, all that is at stake is an order not to engage in illegal
activity, and it is possible that the respondent will not defend as vigorously as he might if he were
aware of the large sums at stake in treble damages. Of course, future parties to FTC actions
should be on notice of the potential effect of an FTC order.
124. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (Supp. IV, 1969) [hereinafter
referred to as APA].
125. Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-7.2 (1969).
126. Section 5 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. IV, 1969), establishes the procedures
for adjudications required by statute. Since the FTC is required by statute to provide a hearing,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), the agency is required to comply with the APA.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) empowers the FTC to make rules and regulations to carry out its
delegated duties. Section 4 of the APA governs rule making activities and exempts agency rules
of practice or procedure. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (Supp. IV, 1969).
128. 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.31-.37 (1969).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"' its availability, in conjunction
with the subpoena power of the FTC 130 and the provision for a
prehearing conference, 13 appear adequate to eliminate the
"surprise" element, at least for a diligent party 32 The right to
representation by counsel in FTC proceedings is provided by
statute.'33 In fact, the FTC has recently decided that counsel must
be provided indigent respondents at government expense in certain
proceedings, 34 and it is, therefore, providing a higher level of
protection for the rights of the alleged violator than would be
afforded in a normal civil suit. The right to cross-examine witnesses
is provided by the FTC rules, 35 and likewise, the APA provides for
"such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts.' 36
The evidentiary standards of an administrative hearing' allow
the use of evidence such as hearsay which would normally not be
admissible in a judicial proceeding before a jury and provide a
frequent source of support for persons wishing to distinguish judicial
and administrative adjudications. 3 However, the differences are
more illusory than real, and, even if the complaints are valid, the
admission of hearsay evidence is seldom grounds for reversible error,
at least in non-jury trials.139 Standards for the admission of evidence
129. Compare id. with FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. A major distinction is that FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b) generally allows discovery for any matter relevant to the subject matter of the suit, while
the FTC's rules, 16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (1969), provide for discovery at the discretion of the hearing
examiner if necessary, and the discovery may not be accomplished by voluntary means. See
generally Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade
Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 113, 142-46 (1968).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964); 16 C.F.R. § 3.34 (1969).
131. 16C.F.R. § 3.21 (1969).
132. Although the hearings are to be expeditious, the hearing examiner has the power "to
order brief intervals to permit discovery." 16 C.F.R. § 3.41(b) (1969). Thus, if a party is
"surprised" by evidence introduced by the FTC, he may ask for delay to utilize either discovery
or the Commission's subpoena power to bolster his own evidence. Failure to allow such delay
could be grounds for reversal on appeal.
133. See 14 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964); 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.41(c), 4.1(a)(1) (1969). The APA
provision regarding counsel is contained in 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
134. American Chinchilla Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,059 (FTC 1969), discussed in
Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1969, 1970 DUKE L.J. 112-17.
135. 16 C.F.R. § 3.41(c) (1969).
136. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
137. Id., 16 C.F.R. § 3.43(b) (1969).
138. See, e.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 73 (lst Cir.
1969).
139. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D. Mass. 1950). See
generally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.02 (1958); Davis, Hearsay In
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in agency proceedings are prescribed by FTC rule and the A PA and
are phrased to exclude testimony that is not trustworthy."" Even
when evidence which would traditionally be defined as hearsay is
admitted, it alone may not be sufficient to sustain a finding due to
the "substantial evidence" review criterion, although this standard
of review has been subjected to criticism."' Overall, the procedures
used for the conduct of the hearing itself appear to be sufficiently
fair to compare favorably with judicial practices.
More pertinent criticism can be made regarding the decisional
process of the FTC. Separation of functions does not exist; the
agency operates as both prosecutor and judge.' Although several
rationalizations may be made to suggest the minimal impact of this
organizational structure, 43 there can be little doubt that less
possibility for bias exists with an independent judiciary.144 This
.Vonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1970). One commentator has noted that the courts have
disregarded formalistic evidence rules in antitrust proceedings, but, contrary to what might be
expected, these rules still plague the FTC. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CH.
L. REv. 47, 52-53 (1969).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. IV, 1969) ("reliable, probative and substantial evidence"); 16
C.F.R. § 3.43(b) (1969) ("Irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable, and unduly repetitious evidence
shall be excluded.").
141. "The reviewing court shall . . .set aside agency action . . . found to be...
unsupported by substantial evidence .... " 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (Supp. IV, 1969). See
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (hearsay is not substantial evidence);
Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44, rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. granted sub
nora. Finch v. Perales, 38 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. April 21, 1970) (No. 1302). See also 1970 DuKE
L.J., supra note 134, at 146-56. But cf NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d
Cir. 1938). Professor Davis is critical of this standard. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 139, § 14.11.
Although the courts are continuing to articulate the standard of review in the terms "substantial
evidence," possibly they are in fact utilizing this test only when "better" evidence is available
but not utilized.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1964); 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 139, §§ 13.04-.05. See generally Note,
Federal Trade Commission Proceedings and Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 53 GEO. L.J. 481,489-
90 (1965).
143. The Farmington court suggested several: (I) Internal separation of functions, 16
C.F.R. § 3.42(f) (1969); (2) Evidentiary use of orders of another similarly organized agency,
the ICC. However, this is by specific statute, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964), rather than judicial
interpretation; (3) Possibility of monetary penalties for violation for an FTC order, suggesting
equality with judicial decisions. Again, this is due to a specific statute, indicating explicit
congressional approval of this action. 15 U.S.C. § 15(l) (1964).
144. An agency employs practices not utilized by courts, such as making speeches, issuing
press releases, and reporting to Congress, whereby a litigant arguably may be prejudiced pending
the hearing of his case. Reviewing courts have normally allowed these activities since one of the
FTC's primary objectives is to inform the public regarding unfair trade practices. E.g., All-State
Indus. v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 73,112 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 1970) (communications to Senate
Committee condemning national trade practices paralleling those of respondent not prejudicial);
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possible lack of independence exists at both the hearing examiner
level and with the Commissioners themselves, who are political
appointees without tenure.145 Recent charges by consumer protection
groups that the FTC and other agencies do not represent the public
but rather zealously support the groups being regulated' would
appear to provide a weak basis for complaint by an industrial
litigant; however, the charges of bias and favoritism do suggest the
dangers created by a lack of independence.'47
The final element essential to procedural fairness is the right to
judicial review of an agency determination. This right is provided by
statute,48 and a right of appeal internally within the FTC itself is
FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968). However,
at least when extreme bias exists, the courts react by vacating the FTC's orders. In Cinderella
Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 73,114 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20,
1970), Chairman Dixon's failure to disqualify himself after making a speech on the subject
under consideration was held to violate due process. In what must be one of the most vehement
personal criticisms in a recent opinion, the court concluded:
Chairman Dixon, sensitive to theory but insensitive to reality [declined to withdraw
from the case] . . . . We find it hard to believe that former Chairman Dixon is so
indifferent to the dictates of the Court of Appeals that he has chosen once again to
put his personal determination of what the law requires ahead of what the courts have
time and again told him the law requires. If this is a question of "discretion and
judgment," Commissioner Dixon has exercised questionable discretion and very poor
judgment indeed, in directing his shafts and squibs at a case awaiting his official action.
We can use his own words in telling Commissioner Dixon that he has acted
"irrespective of the law's requirements"; we will spell out for him once again, avoiding
tired clinche and weary generalization, in no uncertain terms, exactly what those
requirements are, in the fervent hope that this will be the last time we have to travel
this wearisome road.
• . . It is appalling to witness such insensitivity to the requirements of due process;
it is even more remarkable to find ourselves once again confronted with a situation in
which Mr. Dixon, pouncing on the most convenient victim, has determined either to
distort the holdings in the cited cases beyond all reasonable interpretation or to ignore
them altogether. Id.
145. The term of office is seven years. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
146. E.g., Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1970).
147. See generally Posner, supra note 139. A rather long bibliography of publications
criticizing the FTC is contained in id. at 47 n.l. For a comprehensive article recommending
organizational changes in the FTC, see Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal
Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1964). Commissioner Elman has recently
criticized the FTC in many areas, including lack of separation of functions, poor procedures,
and unqualified personnel. SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., iST SEss., RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON
CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT AND RESPONSIVE AGENCY DECISION MAKING 122 (Comm. Print 1969).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964). Seealso 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-04 (Supp. IV, 1969).
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given by the agency's rules.14 The judicial standard for review, that
the agency decision be, inter alia, supported by substantial
evidence, 50 certainly appears adequate to assure fairness.' 5 '
Considerable complaint has been made regarding the vague and
imprecise decrees entered by the FTC after the finding of an antitrust
violation. 5 2 Courts have hesitated to review this portion of the
FTC's activities as closely as other aspects53 since, among other
reasons, the order has had only a prospective effect." 4 However, if
the order is now to be prima facie evidence of a past violation, it
can have a rather severe punitive impact for antecedent activity. 15
Thus, even closer judicial scrutiny and demand for explicitness may
be expected.
As a final analysis, the totality of the procedural safeguards
provided must be compared to the nature of the right which may be
contravened if these procedures are in fact not wholly fair.5" Since
the prior determination is admissible only as prima facie evidence
and is therefore rebuttable, 57 and the evidence is directed at only one
149. 16 C.F.R. § 3.52 (1969). However, the agency does not always follow its published
procedures for reviewing an initial decision. See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing School,
Inc. v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 73,114 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1970) (FTC cannot ignore
findings of Trial Examiner and make a complete de novo determination).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (Supp. IV, 1969). The agency action may also be reversed if
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, id. § 706(2)(A), unconstitutional,
id. § 706(2)(B), ultra vires, id. 706(2)(C), or without propelr procedure, id. § 706(2)(D).
151. A commentator suggests that the standard for review over agency activity has
coalesced with the standard utilized by circuit courts over the district courts, that is, clearly
erroneous. Howery, Some Thoughts on Commission Fact Finding and Judicial Review, 14
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 32, 36 (1959).
152. See generally Austern, supra note 14, at 299; Kauper, supra note 35.
153. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611,613 (1946).
154. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,473 (1952).
155. In theory, only the portion of the order that is supported by the findings of the FTC
will be admitted, Kauper, supra note 35, at 1144 & n.209, but this theory may not be
consistently applied without a complete review of the FTC proceeding.
156. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1452 (1968).
157. Without strict judicial control, the introduction of prior judgments may be extremely
dangerous and prejudicial. Timberlake, The Use of Government Judgments or Decrees in
Subsequent Treble Damage Litigation, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1961). In practice, it may
create a conclusive presumption of guilt. Seeley, The Pitfalls Which Lurk in Government
Litigation for Defendants Who May be Subjected to Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST
BULL. 17, 20-21 (1959).
One writer has suggested that the prior judgment or order be given conclusive effect. Note,
Closing an Antitrust Loophole: Collateral Effect for Nolo Pleas and Government Settlements,
55 VA. L. REV. 1334, 1346 (1969). See also Rockefeller, supra note 48, at 285-86. This would
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of the three major issues that must be litigated in a treble damage
suit, 15 the FTC procedure, though short of judicial standards in
some respects, would appear to be adequate to assure "the day in
court"'5 9 demanded by the framers of section 5(a). Even though a
private litigant can be aided by FTC activities without giving prima
facie effect to FTC orders, 160 the Farmington opinion represents no
greater "discreet judicial legislation"'' than that practiced by the
Supreme Court in 3M and is likely to be followed by all but the
most literal constructionists unless additional consideration is given
to the relation of section 5 to the total system of antitrust laws.
Farmington's impact on the attainment of the goals of antitrust
policy is uncertain. The potential amount of financial damage to the
litigant who loses at the FTC level due to subsequent treble damage
suits may have the beneficial effect of encouraging consent decrees
since they are not usable as prima facie evidence. 62 While this is of
no benefit to the private plaintiff,6 3 overall antitrust policy would
seem to be furthered. However, if either the FTC refuses to accept
the consent decree or the respondent refuses to consent, litigation
may become protracted since a respondent will surely resist even
undoubtedly require a statutory amendment, as would an extension of section 5(a) to apply
to FTC orders issued for FTC Act violations. But see Lippa's, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc., 305 F.
Supp. 182 (D. Vt. 1969) (action under FTC Act tolls statute of limitations under section 5(b)).
158. The three factors are:
(1) Violation of the antitrust laws; (2) Damage to business or property; (3) Causal connec-
tion between (1) & (2). Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 389 F.
2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1961). Perhaps the most difficult to prove with certainty is (2).
Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiffs Antitrust Damage Suit, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 31
(1959).
159. 51 CONG. REc. 9169passim (1914).
160. A treble damage plaintiff will have the advantage of the reported decision and
transcript of the FTC action. He may also be able to utilize discovery or the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV, 1969), to obtain the FTC's files concerning the
adjudication. However, unless this effort is encouraged by the FTC, he is unlikely to have
success at the latter, either due to claims of executive privilege or an exception to the Freedom
of Information Act. See 78 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471 (1964). A suggestion has been made to
admit FTC decrees but give them a different weight due to the procedures used by the FTC.
Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
627, 628 (1965).
161. 65 COLUM. L. REV. 158, 162 (1965).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1964) does "not apply to consent decrees." However, a bill has
been introduced that would make documentary evidence available to private parties when the
government accepts a consent decree. H.R. 16,551, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-I (Mar. 24, 1970).
163. In fact, consent decrees may be detrimental to the private litigant since no public
record is created which might be of aid in preparing the subsequent case. Of course, modern
discovery practices enable a party, at a cost, to garner the same information obtainable by
the FTC.
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more vigorously rather than risk an unfavorable order usable in a
subsequent treble damage action."'4 If the FTC is successful, the
burden on the courts may be increased by plaintiffs seeking treble
damage "windfalls," arguably reversing the role of private antitrust
enforcement actions.165
A possibility of unfairness to the respondent also exists, not
solely from the potentially different quality of justice dispensed by
the FTC,'66 but also due to the type of violation being pursued by
the agency. Pressure is increasing on the FTC to be innovative in
its selection of areas to be attacked as anticompetitive.'
Commissioner Elman, for example, has suggested that the agency's
energy should not be expended in areas where per se rules are
applicable but that the FTC "should at last begin to function as a
policy making body, fashioning and expounding new law and policy
within the broad ambit of the statutes it administers."' 68 This
desirable innovation may be satisfactory when an FTC order has
only a prospective effect, but now that it is usable as evidence of past
antitrust transgressions, closer scrutiny is required. Possibly a
double standard should govern the use of FTC orders. Orders
entered for Violations in areas where the law is clear and settled
could be usable under section 5(a), but orders issued by the FTC in
its innovative capacity would not be of further benefit. 6 9
Congressional clarification in this area would be welcome, especially
since legislative intention is certainly not explicit, and may be
required if the FTC is to move toward functioning as an effective
administrative body by obtaining the maximum utilization from its
technical expertise and quasi-legislative capabilities in order to
improve competitive conditions rather than acting as merely another
court.
164. The "vigor" of the defense is certainly a matter of degree. In many actions, especially
where divestiture is a possibility, the extra incentive provided by possible future damages is
probably negligible. But in some instances, a respondent might provide little resistance to an
order having merely prospective effect, yet would spare no expense to avoid hundreds of suits
by customers or competitors who could utilize this same order under section 5(a).
165. This would result since the objective of section 5 is generally considered to be to aid
the government's enforcement activity rather than to compensate injured parties.
166. See text accompanying notes 142-47 supra.
167. For an example of the FTC's innovation, see FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568 (1967).
168. SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 147, at
129.
169. The mechanics and procedures of determining which orders could be used are not
without problems. A possible solution might be for the FTC to make a finding whether the
order should be usable in a subsequent action. This finding would be incorporated into the
order and, as part of the order, would be reviewable if appealed.
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